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Abstract
A correlated equilibrium is a fundamental solution concept in game theory that enjoys many
desirable mathematical and algorithmic properties: it can achieve more fair and higher payoffs
than a Nash equilibrium and it can be efficiently computed for a vast class of games. However,
it requires a trusted mediator to assist the players in sampling their moves, which is a major
drawback in many practical applications.
A computational solution to this problem was proposed by Dodis, Halevi and Rabin [DHR00].
They extended the original game by adding a preamble stage, where the players communicate
with each other and then they perform the original game. For this extended game, they show
that any correlated strategy for 2-player games can be achieved, provided that the players are
computationally bounded and can communicate before the game.
The introduction of cryptography with computational security in game theory is of great
interest both from a theoretical and more importantly from a practical point of view. However,
the main game-theoretic question remained open: can we achieve any correlated equilibrium for
2-player games without a trusted mediator and also unconditionally?
In this paper, we provide a positive answer to this question. We show that if the players
can communicate via a quantum channel before the game, then any correlated equilibrium
for 2-player games can be achieved, without a trusted mediator and unconditionally. This
provides another example of a major advantage of quantum information processing: quantum
communication enables players to achieve a real correlated Nash equilibrium unconditionally, a
task which is impossible in the classical world.
More precisely, we prove that for any correlated equilibrium p of a strategic game G, there
exists an extended game (with a quantum communication initial stage) Q with an efficiently
computable approximate Nash equilibrium σ, such that the expected payoff for both players in
σ is at least as high as in p.
The main cryptographic tool used in the construction is the quantum weak coin flipping
protocol of Mochon [Moc07].
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1 Introduction
Game theory is a research area of great importance that studies the behavior of two or more players,
when interacting with each other in order to achieve individual goals. It has found far reaching
applications in the fields of economics, biology, computer science, sociology, political sciences, the
study of Internet and stock markets, among others.
Most games fall into two broad categories: 1) The strategic games, where all players choose their
strategies simultaneously or without knowing the other players’ moves. The payoffs depend on the
joint strategy that is performed by the players, and the game is usually described in a matrix form
when there are only two players; 2) The extensive games, where the players take turns in making
moves. The game is described as a tree, where each node represents a stage of the game, the edges
represent the possible moves and the payoffs are specified at the leaves of the tree. The players
may or may not know the previous moves of the other players (perfect or imperfect information
games). A strategic game is a special case of an extensive game with imperfect information.
Examples of strategic games include the Battle of the Sexes, Prisoner’s Dilemma, Vickrey
auction, Internet routing, job scheduling, etc. Examples of extensive games include chess, the eBay
auction system, evolutionary games, wars, etc.
In order to study the optimal behavior of players in such games, the concept of an equilibrium
has been put forward [vNM44]. A Nash equilibrium, the most fundamental notion of an equilibrium,
is a joint strategy of all players, such that no player has any incentive to change her own strategy
given that all other players retain theirs. One of the seminal results in this area is that every
game has a mixed Nash equilibrium [vNM44, Nas51], i.e. one where the strategy of each player is
a distribution over deterministic strategies. Note that these distributions are uncorrelated across
different players and hence, each player can sample independently her strategy.
Even though the importance of Nash equilibria is unrefuted, there are some drawbacks. First,
the recent breakthrough results by [DGP09, CDT09] have shown that finding a Nash equilibrium
is a computationally hard problem, namely it is PPAD-complete and hence it is not clear how in
real life the players can decide to play according to a Nash equilibrium, when they cannot even
find one in the first place. The (im)possibility of finding an efficient classical or quantum algorithm
for computing Nash equilibria is one of the main open questions in the area. To make matters
worse, in many games there are more than one Nash equilibrium and it is really unclear whether
the players will end up in one of them, and if yes, which one and how. Note that in many cases
these equilibria are not fair, and thus different players have a preference for a different equilibrium.
Let us see a simple example, the Battle of the Sexes, to illustrate the above points. A couple
needs to decide where to go for holidays. Partner A prefers Amsterdam to Barcelona, and Partner
B prefers Barcelona to Amsterdam. But both players prefer going to the same place than ending
up in different places; see the following payoff Table, where the pair of numbers in each entry
represents the payoffs of the two partners in order.
Amsterdam Barcelona
Amsterdam (4,2) (0,0)
Barcelona (0,0) (2,4)
So where should they go? There are two pure Nash equilibria in the above game. They both go
to Amsterdam, and hence have payoffs 4 and 2 respectively, or both go to Barcelona and have
payoffs 2 and 4 respectively. Even though these are Nash equilibria, none of them is fair, causing
the battle of the sexes. There is actually a third Nash equilibrium, a mixed one, where each player
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independently flips a coin and decides to go to their preferred place with probability 2/3 and to the
preferred place of the other player with probability 1/3. In this case, the expected payoff is the same
for both players and equal to 4/3. Even though this is a fair equilibrium, it is pretty inefficient, since
now both players have payoff even less than in the case of the unfair pure equilibrium. Moreover,
there is a 5/9 chance the couple goes in different places, which they really do not prefer.
One simple way to rectify all of these problems is the introduction of the notion of a correlated
(Nash) equilibrium [Aum74]. In such an equilibrium, we allow the strategies of the players to be
drawn from a correlated distribution p, and same as for a Nash equilibrium, we require that each
player has no incentive to deviate given the current sample of his strategy and the information
of the distribution p (but not the sampled strategies of the other players). There are many nice
properties of these equilibria. First, they form a superset of Nash equilibria and hence they always
exist. Moreover, it is not hard to exhibit games with a correlated equilibrium which enjoys fairness
and whose social welfare (i.e. the total payoff of the players) is arbitrarily better than that of
any Nash equilibrium. Second, unlike Nash equilibria, it is computationally easy to compute an
optimal correlated equilibrium by solving an LP, for many types of games, including constant-player,
polymatrix, graphical, hypergraphical, congestion, local effect, scheduling, facility location, network
design and symmetric games [PR08, VNRT07]. In our previous example, a correlated equilibrium
is the strategy where with probability 1/2 the couple goes to Amsterdam or to Barcelona. The
expected payoff for each player is then 3 and the couple is equally happy.
So, why is the notion of correlated equilibrium not the solution to all our problems? Because
in general it is hard to sample from a correlated distribution. In fact, even for the case of two
players and the distribution of the correlated equilibrium being just one fair coin, it is well known
that without any computational assumptions, it is impossible to achieve just that; actually in any
classical protocol one player has a strategy to get his/her desired outcome with probability 1. A
canonical solution to this problem is to introduce a trusted mediator, who in this case flips the fair
coin. However, for many real life scenarios, trusted mediators are simply not available.
A computational solution to this problem was proposed by Dodis, Halevi and Rabin [DHR00],
who showed that classical cryptographic protocols can provide an elegant way to achieve a corre-
lated equilibrium under standard computational hardness assumptions. More specifically, for any
strategic game where the correlated equilibrium can be efficiently computed, they do the following:
Before playing the game, the players communicate in order to sample a joint strategy from the
equilibrium distribution, in such a way that each player at the end of the protocol only knows her
strategy and has no information about the other players’ moves apart from the fact that they come
from the equilibrium distribution. The privacy and correctness of this procedure are guaranteed
by the fact that the players are computationally bounded and the assumption that a primitive,
equivalent to Oblivious Transfer, exists. Then, the players play the original game. Since they
have no information about the other players’ strategies and the joint strategy is sampled from a
correlated equilibrium of the original game, they have no incentive to deviate. In other words,
being honest during the communication phase and playing the move that resulted from the com-
munication phase is a Nash equilibrium of the new extended game that achieves payoff equal to
the correlated equilibrium of the original game. The introduction of cryptography in game theory
is a very promising idea that nevertheless needs to be used with caution due to the many nuances
in the two models. Note, last, that the use of cryptography by Dodis et al. provides a solution
only when one is willing to accept the notion of computational equilibria, which are very different
than the equilibria used by game theorists. Since then, a series of works have studied the relation
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between cryptography and game theory [FS02,LMPS04, IML05,ADGH06].
In our paper we show that, in fact, one need not resort to computational equilibria, if we allow
the players to communicate via a quantum channel instead of a classical one. This provides another
example of a major advantage of quantum information processing: quantum communication enables
players to achieve a real correlated Nash equilibrium. Note that we only make the communication
before the game quantum but the game itself remains a classical one.
A priori, it is not clear that quantum communication can provide any significant advantage,
since we know that Oblivious Transfer, the primitive that Dodis, Halevi and Rabin need for their
construction, is impossible even in the quantum world [Lo97]. We overcome this problem by
providing a new way to extend any game with an efficient correlated equilibrium into a new game
that has an efficient Nash equilibrium achieving equal or even better payoffs (up to an arbitrarily
small ε). The construction is based on the existence of a weaker primitive, called Weak Coin
Flipping. This primitive is impossible classically without any computational assumptions. In the
quantum world, however, Mochon [Moc07] has showed in a powerful result that there exists a
quantum coin flipping protocol, where player A prefers Head and player B prefers Tail (which is
exactly the case in the Battle of the Sexes), such that if one player plays the honest strategy, then
no matter how the other player plays, the bias of the coin cannot exceed an arbitrarily small ε.
At a high level, the new game we construct has the following three stages: 1) Communication
stage: the players use as a subroutine the quantum weak coin flipping protocol in order to sample a
suggested joint strategy from the distribution of the original correlated equilibrium. Note that we
do not preserve privacy of the moves, i.e. at the end of this procedure both players know the joint
strategy. 2) Game stage: the players play the original game. Note of course that since each player
knows the suggested strategy for the other player, it may be to her advantage to change her strategy
instead of following the suggestion. We remedy this situation by using the usual “Punishment for
Deviation” method in the final stage. 3) Checking stage: the players submit an Accept/Reject
move, where a player plays Reject if the strategy of the other player during the second stage is not
equal to the suggested one. The payoff of the players is equal to the one in the original game if they
both play Accept in the last phase, and 0 otherwise. Note that we do not need the Accept/Reject
moves to be simultaneous.
It is not hard to see that being honest during the communication stage and playing the suggested
move is an approximate Nash equilibrium for this game and it achieves payoff equal to the correlated
equilibrium of the original game. Let us assume that one of the players is dishonest while the other
is playing the honest strategy. The cheating player can deviate during the coin flipping process
but this will only increase his payoff by at most an ε fraction by the security of the coin flipping
protocol. Then, in the second stage, he can deviate by not playing the suggested strategy, but then
his payoff will be 0 since the honest player will play Reject in the Checking stage. Hence, there is
no significant advantage for any player to deviate from the honest strategy.
Theorem 1 For any correlated equilibrium p of a game G, there exists an extended game Q with
a Nash equilibrium σ, such that the expected payoff for both players in σ is at least as high as in p.
Let us make a more detailed comparison with the results of Dodis, Halevi and Rabin [DHR00].
They describe an extended game, first introduced by Barany [Ba´r92], that involves a communication
stage and then the game stage. In the communication stage, they securely compute a functionality
that they call Correlated Element Selection. This consists of two players sampling a joint strategy
from a correlated distribution, with the extra privacy property that at the end each player knows
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only his/her own move. Their construction is based on a Blindable Encryption scheme, which is
as strong as Oblivious Transfer, meaning that it is complete for all secure multiparty computation.
Then, in the second stage, the players play the original game.
In our protocol, the communication stage achieves something weaker. We just sample from
the correlated distribution in a way that at the end, both players know the joint strategy. By
removing the privacy constraint we are able to achieve the sampling using the weaker primitive of
Weak Coin Flipping. In both protocols we need to dissuade the players from cheating. In the DHR
protocol, if a player catches the other one cheating during the communication stage, then he plays
his minmax move in the second stage, hence minimizing the other players payoff. Moreover, no one
has an incentive to play a different move than the suggested one (except with exponentially small
probability), hence they do not have to worry about forcing the players to play the suggested move.
We are more explicit in our punishment by adding the Accept/Reject stage, both for dissuading the
players from cheating during the communication stage, but more importantly in order to dissuade
the players from playing a different move from the suggested one. Last, both protocols achieve an
approximate equilibrium, since the communication part is not perfect.
On the other hand, we achieve something much stronger than before, which is that we do not
make any assumptions about the computational power of the players. Hence we are able to use
quantum communication to achieve a real correlated equilibrium for a large array of different types
of games with unconditionally powerful players and without a trusted mediator.
A few remarks are in order for this extra checking stage that we add to the original game. First,
note that all the equilibria remain unchanged, since we specified the payoffs of any joint strategy
with a Reject move as 0. Hence, sampling a correlated equilibrium in the new game is equivalent to
sampling a correlated equilibrium in the original game. This means that the quantum advantage
comes from the sampling part and not due to the checking part. For a fair comparison, we can
also augment the classical game with the choice of Accept/Reject. It is not hard to see that the
players still cannot sample a correlated equilibrium in this new game. In particular, consider the
bimatrix game, in which the only fair correlated equilibrium with total payoff 1 is to choose (0, 0)
and (1, 1) each with half probability. This is a (fair) coin flip, which is known to be impossible
to sample. Even if we extend the game with the Accept/Reject stage, the only fair correlated
equilibrium with total payoff 1 is to choose (0,Accept; 0,Accept) and (1,Accept; 1,Accept) each
with half probability. But this results in flipping a coin again. Note that we use the normal-form
for convenience even though the Accept/Reject stage is not simultaneous.
0 1
0 (1,0) (0,0)
1 (0,0) (0,1)
(0,Accept) (1,Accept) (0,Reject) (1,Reject)
(0,Accept) (1,0) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0)
(1,Accept) (0,0) (0,1) (0,0) (0,0)
(0,Reject) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0)
(1,Reject) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0)
Second, in many cases, the checking stage is actually not necessary. For example, for a large
class of games, an optimal correlated equilibrium has support only on a set of pure Nash equilibria.
In these correlated equilibria, knowing the other players’ sampled strategies s−i does not give any
incentive for Player i to deviate from her own sampled strategy si, since s is already a pure Nash
equilibrium. Note that our previous example of Battle of the Sexes falls into this family of games.
Third, in many practical situations, breaking preagreed rules is considered losing (and thus
given the least payoff) automatically. Many games in sports are of this nature. For example, when
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the referee tosses a coin to decide the side of the court for each team, both teams know the outcome
of this random process and are not allowed to disagree no matter the outcome; otherwise the team
will be claimed to lose by the referee immediately. Moreover, in extensive games, the checking phase
is already implicitly present. In the middle of a chess game, only a subset of moves is compatible
with the stage of the game and hence if a player decides to play some other move, then the other
player will Reject either immediately or at the end of the game. Hence, adding an Accept/Reject
stage only makes explicit what is implicitly present in any game, that if a player breaks the rules
then the other one rejects the outcome of the game.
Fourth, our Accept/Reject stage is not simultaneous. One has to be very careful with adding
simultaneous moves to a game, since two players can flip a fair coin with a simultaneous move
where each plays one of two possible moves at random. If the two moves are the same then the coin
is Head and if different the coin is Tail. Here, we do not add the ability to play simultaneously.
Going back to our Battle of the Sexes game, from the properties of the quantum coin flip,
it is not hard to see that the strategy of both players being honest during the coin flip is a 2ε-
approximate Nash equilibrium with payoff 3 for both players (equal to the original correlated Nash
equilibrium); if one player decides to play any other strategy while the other one remains honest,
then the cheating player’s payoff will be no more than than (1/2+ε)·4+(1/2−ε)·2 = 3+2ε (In later
sections, we normalize the game by scaling all utilities to be within [0, 1] for a fair comparison). As
we have said, one can easily generalize this and other games so that the correlated Nash equilibria
be made arbitrarily better and more fair than all the Nash equilibria, which are the only ones that
can be sampled classically without a trusted mediator.
Note that our protocol does not provide a quantum algorithm to compute a Nash equilibrium.
However, it almost renders this question moot. Instead of a quantum algorithm to compute a Nash
equilibrium, there is a quantum protocol where the players can generate a correlated equilibrium,
which enjoys desirable properties such as fairness and higher payoff.
Since our protocol uses quantum channels, one may wonder whether the power of two-way quan-
tum communication enables us to achieve any quantum equilibrium with payoff higher than any
classical correlated equilibrium. This is actually not possible: Any quantum protocol eventually
generates a joint strategy s according to some correlated distribution p. If the players’ behaviors
in the protocol form a Nash equilibrium (in the sense that no player has any incentive to use other
sequence of quantum operations), then the resulting distribution p is a quantum correlated equi-
librium of the quantized game, because otherwise the players would like to change their behaviors
in the last step. By an observation in [Zha10], p is also a (classical) correlated equilibrium of the
original (classical) game, which the present paper already gives a way to generate.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Game Theory
In a classical strategic game with n players, labeled by {1, 2, . . . , n}, each player i has a set Si
of strategies. We use s = (s1, . . . , sn) to denote the joint strategy selected by the players and
S = S1×. . .×Sn to denote the set of all possible joint strategies. Each player i has a utility function
ui : S → R, specifying the payoff or utility ui(s) to player i on the joint strategy s. For simplicity
of notation, we use subscript −i to denote the set [n]−{i}, so s−i is (s1, . . . , si−1, si+1, . . . , sn), and
similarly for S−i, p−i, etc.
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In a classical extensive game with perfect information, the players take moves in turns and all
players know the entire history of all players’ moves. An extensive game can be transformed into
strategic form by tabulating all deterministic strategies of the players, which usually results in an
exponential increase in size.
A game is [0, 1]-normalized, or simply normalized, if all utility functions are in [0, 1]. Any game
can be scaled to a normalized one. For a fair comparison, we assume that all games in this paper
are normalized.
A Nash equilibrium is a fundamental solution concept in game theory. Roughly, it says that in
a joint strategy, no player can gain more by changing her strategy, provided that all other players
keep their current strategies unchanged.
Definition 1 A pure Nash equilibrium is a joint strategy s = (si, . . . , sn) ∈ S satisfying
ui(si, s−i) ≥ ui(s′i, s−i), ∀i ∈ [n],∀s′i ∈ Si.
Pure Nash equilibria can be generalized by allowing each player to independently select her strategy
according to some distribution, leading to the following concept of mixed Nash equilibrium.
Definition 2 A (mixed) Nash equilibrium (NE) is a product probability distribution p = p1× . . .×
pn, where each pi is a probability distributions over Si, satisfying∑
s−i
p−i(s−i)ui(si, s−i) ≥
∑
s−i
p−i(s−i)ui(s′i, s−i), ∀i ∈ [n], ∀si, s′i ∈ Si with pi(si) > 0.
A Correlated equilibrium assumes an external party to draw a set of strategies for the players
according to a probability distribution, possibly correlated in an arbitrary way, over S, and suggest
them to each player. If player i receives a suggested strategy si, the player can never increase its
expected utility by switching to another strategy s′i ∈ Si, assuming that all other players are all
going to choose their received suggestion s′.
Definition 3 A correlated Nash equilibrium (CE) is a probability distribution p over S satisfying∑
s−i
p(si, s−i)ui(si, s−i) ≥
∑
s−i
p(si, s−i)ui(s′i, s−i), ∀i ∈ [n], ∀si, s′i ∈ Si.
We will also need an approximate version of equilibrium, which basically says that no Player i
can gain much by changing the suggested strategy si. Depending on whether we require the limit
of the gain for each possible si in the support of p or on average of p, one can define worst-case and
average-case approximate equilibrium. It turns out that the average-case one, as defined below, has
many nice properties, such as being the limit of a natural dynamics of minimum regrets ( [VNRT07],
Chapter 4) and hence it is the one we will use.
Definition 4 An ε-correlated equilibrium is a probability distribution p over S satisfying
Es←p[ui(s′i(si), s−i)] ≤ Es←p[ui(si, s−i)] + ε,
for any i and any function s′i : Si → Si. An ε-correlated equilibrium p is an ε-Nash equilibrium if
it is a product distribution p = p1 × · · · × pn.
We can also define equilibria for extensive games by defining the corresponding equilibria on
their strategic form.
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2.2 Cryptography
We provide the formal definition of a weak coin flipping protocol.
Definition 5 A weak coin flipping protocol between two parties Alice and Bob is a protocol where
Alice and Bob interact and at the end, Alice outputs a value cA ∈ {0, 1} and Bob outputs a value
cB ∈ {0, 1}. If cA = cB, we say that the protocol outputs c = cA. If cA 6= cB then the protocol
outputs c = ⊥.
An (a, ε)-weak coin flipping protocol (WCF (a, ε)) has the following properties:
• If c = a, we say that Alice wins. If c = 1− a, we say that Bob wins.
• If Alice and Bob are honest then Pr[Alice wins] = Pr[Bob wins] = 1/2
• If Alice cheats and Bob is honest then P ∗A = Pr[Alice wins] ≤ 1/2 + ε
• If Bob cheats and Alice is honest then P ∗B = Pr[Bob wins] ≤ 1/2 + ε
P ∗A and P
∗
B are the cheating probabilities of Alice and Bob. The cheating probability of the
protocol is defined as max{P ∗A, P ∗B}.
Note that in the definition the players do not abort, since a player that wants to abort can
always declare victory rather than aborting without reducing the security of the protocol.
We will use the following result by Mochon.
Proposition 1 [Moc07] For every ε > 0 and a ∈ {0, 1}, there exists a quantum WCF (a, ε)
protocol P .
Note that this is a weaker definition of a usual coin flip, since here, we assign a winning value
for each player. Even though each player cannot bias the coin towards this winning value, he or she
can bias the coin towards the losing value with probability 1. Weak coin flipping is possible using
quantum communication, though for the strong coin flipping the optimal cheating probability for
any protocol is 1/
√
2 [Kit03,CK09].
In the following section we will use weak coin flipping as a subroutine for the following cryp-
tographic primitive, that enables two players to jointly sample from a correlated distribution, in a
way that no dishonest player can force a distribution which is far from the honest one.
Definition 6 A Correlated Strategy Sampling protocol between two players P1 and P2 is an inter-
active protocol where the players receive as input a game G with an efficiently computable correlated
equilibrium p and at the end, P1 outputs a joint strategy (s1, s2) ∈ S1 × S2 and P2 outputs a joint
strategy (s′1, s′2) ∈ S1 × S2. If (s1, s2) = (s′1, s′2), we say the protocol outputs s = (s1, s2). If
(s1, s2) 6= (s′1, s′2) then we say the protocol outputs s = ⊥.
An (ε, δ)-Correlated Strategy Sampling procedure satisfies the following properties:
1. If both players follow the honest strategy, then they both output the same joint strategy s =
(s1, s2), where (s1, s2)← ph for some distribution ph, s.t.
for both i ∈ {1, 2}, E(s1,s2)←ph [ui(s1, s2)] ≥ E(s1,s2)←p[ui(s1, s2)]−δ
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2. If Player 1 is dishonest and Player 2 is honest (similarly for the other case), then Player 2
outputs a joint strategy (s1, s2) distributed according to some q, s.t.
E(s1,s2)←q[u2(s1, s2)] ≥ E(s1,s2)←ph [u2(s1, s2)]− ε
E(s1,s2)←q[u1(s1, s2)] ≤ E(s1,s2)←ph [u1(s1, s2)] + ε
Note again, that similar to the case of the weak coin flip, the players do not abort, since a player
that wants to abort can always choose the joint strategy that is best for him rather than aborting
without reducing the security of the protocol.
3 The extended game
For simplicity, we consider a two-player strategic game G of size n, but our results easily extend to
more players. We describe how to derive an extended game Q from any such G.
Similar to the DHR extended game, we assume that the players can communicate with each
other before they start playing the game, but now via a quantum channel. In this preamble stage
they perform a quantum protocol that we call Correlated Strategy Sampling.
In the following section we show how to implement this procedure unconditionally, using a Weak
Coin Flipping subroutine with bias ε′= O(ε/ log n).
Then, we extend the original game G to a 2-stage game, where the first stage is identical to the
game G and for the second stage, which we call the Checking stage, the available moves for each
player are Accept or Reject. We define the payoff for any joint strategy where some player outputs
Reject in the second stage to be 0.
Extended Game Q
1. Communication Stage: The two players perform the Correlated Strategy Sampling
procedure for the game G and correlated equilibrium p.
2. Game Stage: The two players play the original game G.
3. Checking Stage: The two players each play a move from the set {A,R}.
We can now restate and prove our main theorem.
Theorem 1 For any correlated equilibrium p of the game G of size n, and for any ε, δ > 0, there ex-
ists an extended game Q with an ε-Nash equilibrium σ that can be computed in time poly(n, 1/δ, 1/ε)
and such that the expected payoff for both players in σ is at least as high as the one in p minus δ.
Proof We describe Player 1’s strategy in the ε-Nash equilibrium σ as follows (Player 2’s strategy
is symmetric): In the Communication Stage, Player 1 is honest and obtains an output (s1, s2). In
the Game Stage, he plays the move s1. In the Checking Stage, he plays A if Player 2’s move in the
Game Stage was s2 and R otherwise.
Let us show that this is indeed an ε-Nash equilibrium. A dishonest player (assume Player 1)
can try to increase his payoff by first deviating from the protocol in the Communication Stage. If
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Player 2 outputs a joint strategy (s1, s2) then we know from the security of the Correlated Strategy
Sampling procedure that this is a sample from a distribution q s.t.
E(s1,s2)←q[u1(s1, s2)] ≤ E(s1,s2)←ph [u1(s1, s2)] + ε
Hence, if Player 1 is dishonest during Stage 1 and then plays s1 in Stage 2, then his gain is at
most ε. If he decides to change his move, then the honest player would play R in Stage 3, so his
payoff would be 0. Overall, no matter what strategy the dishonest player follows he cannot increase
his payoff more than ε from the honest strategy mentioned above, and hence this strategy is an
ε-approximate Nash equilibrium. 
Note that from the security of the Correlated Strategy Sampling procedure we also have
E(s1,s2)←q[u2(s1, s2)] ≥ E(s1,s2)←ph [u2(s1, s2)]− ε
Hence, we have the following interesting corollary
Corollary 1 In the extended game Q, the expected payoff of the honest player will not decrease by
more than ε, no matter how the dishonest player deviates, unless the dishonest player makes both
players’ payoff equal to 0.
In other words, the honest strategy remains an equilibrium even if the objective of a player is not
to maximize his own payoff but rather maximize the difference between the players’ payoffs.
4 The Correlated Strategy Sampling procedure
Let us start by fixing some notation. In a two-player game, let p be an efficiently computable
correlated equilibrium that the players know and aim to generate. A typical scenario is that p
is the lexicographically first correlated equilibrium that maximizes the total payoff. Let p be the
distribution of the CE of the original game G of size n. If the distribution is not uniform we can
emulate it by a uniform distribution on a multiset of size K = n/δ (we choose K = 2k) and the
distance between the two distributions is an inverse polynomial of n. Let ph be the distribution
that arises when both players are honest and q the distribution of the honest player’s output when
the other player is dishonest. All distributions are on {0, 1}k.
Let us also define the following distributions for all m ∈ {0, 1, ..., k}:
pc
1,...,cm
h : {0, 1}k−m → R s.t. pc
1,...,cm
h (r
m+1, . . . , rk) =
ph(c
1, . . . , cm, rm+1, . . . , rk)∑
rm+1,...,rk ph(c
1, . . . , cm, rm+1, . . . , rk)
qm : {0, 1}m → R s.t. qm(c1, . . . , cm) =
∑
rm+1,...,rk
q(c1, . . . , cm, rm+1, . . . , rk)
pmh : {0, 1}m → R s.t. pmh (c1, . . . , cm) =
∑
rm+1,...,rk
ph(c
1, . . . , cm, rm+1, . . . , rk)
Note that q0 = p0h = 1. Also, by (s1, s2) ← pc
1,...,cm
h we mean the distribution on joint strategies
(s1, s2) or equivalently `-bit strings that arises from ph conditionned on the first m bits of ` being
c1, . . . , cm. Let sign(a) be the function which is 1 if a ≥ 0 and −1 if a < 0. The protocol appears
in the following figure.
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(ε, δ)-Correlated Strategy Sampling Protocol
Input: A game G of size n with an efficiently computable correlated equilibrium p.
1. Each Player i computes locally the equilibrium p and emulates p by a uniform distri-
bution on a multiset of joint strategies {(s`1, s`2)}`∈{0,1}k , with k = O(log n).
2. for j = 1 to k
(a) Each Player i computes and announces his preference
aji = sign
(
E
(s1,s2)←pc1,...,cj−1,0h
[ui(s1, s2)]− E
(s1,s2)←pc1,...,cj−1,1h
[ui(s1, s2)]
)
.
(b) if aj1a
j
2 = −1,
Run WCF (aj1, ε/(2k)). Let the outcome of Player i be c
j
i ∈ {0, 1}.
else
Set cj1 = c
j
2 = a
j
1, their commonly desirable value.
3. Each Player i outputs (s`1, s
`
2), with ` = c
1
i ...c
k
i
Analysis First, if both players are honest then their expected utility is at least as high as in the
original CE, up to an additive error δ due to the precision of using k bits to emulate p. If in all
rounds they flip a fair coin then their expected utility is exactly the same as in p. If at some round
they both agree on a preferred value then this increases both players expected utility.
We now prove that no dishonest player can increase his utility by much compared to his honest
utility. Without loss of generality, we assume that a dishonest player will always announce his
preference honestly and then try to win the weak coin flipping protocol (if their preferences differ),
since this can only increase his utility.
Let us assume without loss of generality that Player 1 is dishonest and Player 2 is honest. We
will prove that after round m, we have
Claim 1 ||qm − pmh ||1 ≤ m εk .
The proof is in the next subsection. By the Claim, after the k-th round we have
||qk − pkh||1 = ||q − ph||1 ≤ ε
This means, that the expected utility of the dishonest player over the distribution q is
E(s1,s2)←q[u1(s1, s2)] ≤ E(s1,s2)←ph [u1(s1, s2)] + ε
since all the utilities are normalized. Moreover, for the honest player we have
E(s1,s2)←q[u2(s1, s2)] ≥ E(s1,s2)←ph [u2(s1, s2)]− ε
The same analysis holds when Player 2 is dishonest. Also, it is easy to see that the complexity
of the protocol is polynomial in n/δ and 1/ε. This completes the proof of our main theorem.
A final remark is that the same protocol can be used for general k-player games. In each round,
some players prefer cm to be 0 and some players prefer 1. We can then let two representatives, one
from each group, to do the weak coin flipping, at the end of which the representatives announce
the bits. If one representative lies, then the other reject in the third stage. The previous analysis
then easily applies to this scenario as well.
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4.1 Proof of Claim 1
The base case of m = 0 is trivial because q0 = p0h = 1.
Let us assume now that after round m, we have proved the above inequality, then for the
(m+ 1)− th round, there are two cases. First, the players agree on the bit, then the distance of the
distributions ‖qm+1 − pm+1h ‖1 remains the same as ‖qm − pmh ‖1. The second case is that the two
players have different preferences for cm+1. Assume without loss of generality that Player 1 prefers
0 and Player 2 prefers 1. We have
||qm+1 − pm+1||1
=
∑
c1,...,cm+1
∣∣∣qm+1(c1, . . . , cm+1)− pm+1h (c1, . . . , cm+1)∣∣∣
=
∑
c1,...,cm+1
∣∣∣ ∑
rm+2,...,rk
[
q(c1, . . . , cm+1, rm+2, . . . , rk)− ph(c1, . . . , cm+1, rm+2, . . . , rk)
]∣∣∣
=
∑
c1,...,cm
(∣∣ ∑
rm+2,...,rk
[
q(c1, . . . , cm, 0, rm+2, . . . , rk)− ph(c1, . . . , cm, 0, rm+2, . . . , rk)
]∣∣
+
∣∣ ∑
rm+2,...,rk
[
q(c1, . . . , cm, 1, rm+2, . . . , rk)− ph(c1, . . . , cm, 1, rm+2, . . . , rk)
]∣∣)
≤
∑
c1,...,cm
(∣∣ ∑
rm+1,...,rk
[
(
1
2
+
ε
2k
)q(c1, . . . , cm, rm+1, rm+2, . . . , rk)− 1
2
ph(c
1, . . . , cm, rm+1, rm+2, . . . , rk)
]∣∣
+
∣∣ ∑
rm+1,...,rk
[
(
1
2
− ε
2k
)q(c1, . . . , cm, rm+1, rm+2, . . . , rk)− 1
2
ph(c
1, . . . , cm, rm+1, rm+2, . . . , rk)
]∣∣)
≤ ||qm − pmh ||1 +
ε
k
· 1
≤ (m+ 1) ε
k
In the above inequalities we used the fact that the bias of the weak coin flipping protocol is
always less than ε/2k no matter what the values of the previous coins are. In fact, the security
proof for the bias holds against a dishonest player that may possess a quantum auxiliary input,
hence includes the situation where the dishonest player may try to entangle the different executions
of the coin flips.
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